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REFUGEE PROTECTION IN THE UNITED 
STATES POST-SEPTEMBER 11 
Andrew I. Schoenholtz* 
To My Teacher and Colleague, Arthur Helton, Whose 
Leadership and Example Inspires the Displaced And 
All Those Who Work to Protect Them. 
The plane full of Mghan refugees landed at John F. Kennedy 
Airport (JFK) like many had prior to September 2001. The State 
Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration had 
selected these particular refugees for entry into the United States, 
after each had been interviewed and approved by the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service. The International Organization for 
Migration had arranged transportation to the United States, where 
these refugees would be resettled in a multitude of communities 
throughout the country. Local church groups and community 
organizations were prepared to receive them. l 
Unfortunately, these Mghan refugees arrived at JFKjust two 
weeks after terrorist attacks killed thousands in New York and 
* The author is the Deputy Director of Georgetown University's Institute 
for the Study of International Migration and teaches refugee and immigration 
law and policy at Georgetown University Law Center and Walsh School of 
Foreign Service. This analysis depends considerably on data provided by two U.S. 
government agencies: Headquarters Asylum Division, Office of Refugee, Asylum, 
and International Operations, United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services, Department of Homeland Security; and the Office of Planning, Analysis 
and Technology, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Department of Justice. 
The author is particularly grateful to the assistance extended to him by key 
personnel at these agencies in terms of both providing and understanding asylum 
data. The author would also like to thank two research assistants, Tracey King 
and Chiara Spector, for their help on this article. 
1. Interview with U.S. government official in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 17, 
2001). 
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toppled the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center. Airport officials 
alerted Mayor Giuliani's office that hundreds of Afghans had just 
arrived by plane at JFK. Alarmed, the Mayor called Vice President 
Cheney. Within days, the premier refugee resettlement program in 
the world that had brought some 2.5 million refugees to the United 
States since 1975 was shut down.2 Almost three years later, this 
program is still running at only about two-thirds of its previous 
capacity; more than 100,000 refugees have lost opportunities to build 
new lives in the United States during this period.3 
The U.S. refugee resettlement program, which David Martin 
writes about in this issue, was the first refugee protection casualty of 
the terrorist attacks. American officials perceived resettlement as 
being particularly vulnerable to security problems.4 That was not the 
case with the other major U.S. refugee protection program, the 
asylum system. That system was effectively revamped in 1995 to 
address a variety of abuses, in part connected to individuals involved 
in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.5 Yet, even though official 
attention did not focus on asylum6, subtle, significant changes have 
occurred. This article delineates and assesses these changes by 
closely examining data and developments at all levels of the asylum 
2. Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Dep't of State, 
Cumulative Summary of Refugee Admissions FY 1975-2004 (2004). 
3. The United States planned to resettle up to 70,000 refugees in each of 
FY 2002, 2003, and 2004. Of those 210,000, about 108,000 refugees were actually 
admitted. Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Dep't of State, 
Proposed Refugee Admissions for FY 2004-Report to Congress (2003), available 
at http://www.state.gov/g/prmlasstlrVrptsl25691.htm (last visited January 20, 
2005). 
4. U.S. Comm. for Refugees, In the Aftermath of September 11: U.S. 
Refugee Resettlement on Hold, 22 Refugee Reports 1 (2001), available at 
http://refugees.org/worldiarticles/aftermath_rr01_9-10.htm; Refugee Resettlement 
in the United States Blocked, Stranding 22,000 Refugees, Asylum Protection 
News 2, (Human Rights First, New York, N.Y.) Nov. 14, 2001, at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylumitorchlightinewsletter/newsleC2.htm. 
5. See U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., Dep't of Justice, Asylum 
Reform: 5 Years Later 7-8 (2000), available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/ 
asylum/asylum_brochure. pdf. 
6. Only three years after the September 11th Attacks did Congress focus some 
attention on asylum. See, H.R. 10, 108th Congo Title III (2004). No law changing the 
asylum system has yet been enacted, nor has the Executive branch deemed it 
necessary to once again reform that system. 
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system. These more subtle changes cumulatively call into question 
how robust the system truly is today. Finally, this study calls for 
major changes to improve the protection of those refugees who 
manage to reach the United States without government assistance. 
I. REFUGEES SEEKING AsYLUM AT PORTS OF ENTRY OR NEAR THE 
BORDER: EXPEDITED REMOVAL 
European nations were the first to create rapid asylum 
procedures, which were practiced in the major countries there by 
1994.7 These procedures are aimed particularly at identifying 
"manifestly unfounded" applications at the airports and other ports 
of entry. Applicants arriving from "safe states" are screened out of 
the regular asylum process and into an accelerated determination 
system.B In Germany, for example, the asylum seeker in this 
situation has forty-eight hours to apply.9 Rejected asylum seekers are 
given three days to file an appeal with an administrative court. In 
the United Kingdom, asylum seekers from "safe" countries are 
returned within twenty-four hours.lO 
In the United States, the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 created an expedited removal 
procedure upon entry for those with fraudulent documentation or 
without documentation.!l Under this procedure, Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) Secondary Immigration Inspectors are 
tasked with discerning whether an individual fears return to the 
country he came from. If no legitimate fear is ascertained and the 
individual is determined to have no other legal right to enter the 
United States, he is deported. If fear is found, the Secondary 
7. Susan Martin & Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Asylum in Practice: Successes, 
Failures, and the Challenges Ahead, 14 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 589, 602 (2000). 
8. Id. 
9. U.S. Comm. for Refugees, Worldwide Refugee Information, Country 
Report: Germany (1997), http://www.refugees.org/worldlcountryrptleuropel1997/ 
germany.htm. 
10. U.S. Comm. for Refugees, Worldwide Refugee Information, Country 
Report: United Kingdom (2002), http://www.refugees.org/worldlcountryrptleuropel 
united_kingdom.htm. 
11. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 235(b), 8 U.S.C § 1225(b) 
(2004); see Martin & Schoenholtz, supra note 7, at 602. 
HeinOnline -- 36 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 326 2004-2005
326 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LA W REVIEW [36:323 
Inspector refers the individual to a DHS Asylum Officer. At that 
point, the asylum seeker must demonstrate that he has a credible 
fear of persecution in order to continue with an asylum application. 
The law mandates that the "credible fear" determination be made 
swiftly and further requires reviewability of that determination by 
an immigration judge, if requested, within one week. Detention is 
mandated during this period of time, and generally attorneys play no 
role in these proceedings.12 Authorities began applying expedited 
removal to those entering land and air ports of entry at the start of 
the program in April 1997. In November 2002, authorities expanded 
expedited removal to cover sea arrivals in response to two boats of 
Haitians that reached Florida.13 In 2004, DHS expanded expedited 
removal to cover areas within one hundred miles of the land borders 
between ports of entry. 14 
Since September 11th, the nuinber of asylum seekers 
interviewed for credible fear determinations has dropped 
considerably. As Chart 1 shows, the numbers dropped by twenty-five 
percent in fiscal year (FY) 2002 from a high of 13,000 in FY 2001, 
and then again by thirty-eight percent in FY 2003 to 6,000.15 In FY 
2004, about 7,000 asylum seekers are expected to have credible fear 
interviews,16 down almost half from FY 2001.l7 
12. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), 8 U.s.C. 
§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV). 
13. Notice Designating Aliens Subject to Expedited Removal Under Section 
235(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 68924, 
68925 (effective Nov. 13, 2002). 
14. Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48877-01 
(effective Aug. 11, 2004). 
15. U.S. Headquarters Asylum Div., Dep't of Homeland Security, Credible 
Fear Determinations FY 1997-2003 (2004) [hereinafter Credible Fear 
Determinations FY 1997-2003) (on file with author). The fiscal year runs from 
October 1 through September 29. See Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of 
State, Frequently Asked Questions (May 2004), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ 
piVpcl32868.htm#f(last visited Jan. 26, 2005). 
16. U.S. Headquarters Asylum Div., Dep't of Homeland Security, Credible 
Fear Determinations FY 2004 (2004) [hereinafter Credible Fear Determinations 
FY 2004) (on file with author). 
17. Credible Fear Determinations FY 1997-2003, supra note 15. 
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Chart 1. Credible Fear Referrals by DHS Asylum Office to Immigration Court, 1999-2003 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Source: Headquarters Asylum Division, Office of Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations, users, DHS 
Significant changes have occurred in the pool of asylum 
seekers interviewed for credible fear. The two largest nationalities in 
FY 2001, Chinese and Colombians, decreased about fifty percent in 
each of FY 2002 and 2003.18 Through June 2004, the number of 
Chinese asylum seekers has not changed from FY 2003, but the 
number of Colombians continues to decline.l9 Sri Lankans 
significantly decreased from over 1,000 to about sixty from FY 2001 
to FY 2003 and remains small.20 Cubans increased fivefold in 
FY2002, then decreased more than fifty percent in FY 2003,21 but 
have again increased substantially in the second and third quarters 
18. Id. 
19. Credible Fear Determinations FY 2004, supra note 16. 
20. Credible Fear Determinations FY 1997-2003," supra note 15. 
21. Id. 
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of FY 2004.22 Haitians decreased twenty-five percent in FY 2002, 
returned to around 1,000 in FY 2003,23 but have decreased 
significantly in FY 2004.24 
A. Assessing the Drop in Numbers of Those Seeking Asylum 
at U.S. Borders 
Why has the number of asylum seekers interviewed for a 
credible fear determination dropped so significantly since September 
11th? In some instances, much depends on the specific circumstances 
of the refugees' country of origin and its relationship with the United 
States. For example, the number of Colombian asylum seekers was 
seriously affected by new laws prohibiting transit through the United 
States on the way to an international destination. In 2001, but prior 
to September 11th, the United States stopped that practice because 
of the number of asylum seekers from Colombia using a stopover to 
claim asylum. According to a March 29, 2001 announcement by the 
U.S. Embassy in Bogota: 
These measures have been taken because of the great 
increase in the number of Colombian citizens who travel to 
the United States without a visa and who use the stop 
there to claim asylum during their 'transit ... .' 
Since January 1, 2001, more than 1,000 Colombian 
citizens have applied for political asylum upon arrival at 
Miami International Airport while in transit status. The 
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service office in 
Miami is currently receiving about 30 requests for political 
asylum daily from Colombians in transit status. Last week, 
as many as 120 Colombians requested asylum in Miami in 
just one day. All of the claimants have entered the United 
States on the premise of transiting through the U.S. to a 
third country without a visa.25 
In contrast to this denial of access, the extraordinary 
decrease in the number of Sri Lankan asylum seekers may be due to 
22. Credible Fear Determinations FY 2004, supra note 16. 
23. Credible Fear Determinations FY 1997-2003, supra note 15. 
24. Credible Fear Determinations FY 2004," supra note 16. 
25. U.S. Embassy, Bogota, Colombia, New Visa Requirement for 
Colombians Transiting the U.S. Enroute to Third Countries, at 
http://bogota.usembassy.gov/wwwsvtle.shtml (last modified Mar. 29, 2001). 
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important progress made in peace negotiations aimed at solving the 
lengthy civil conflict. In February 2002, a ceasefire entered into force 
between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tamil 
Tigers of Ealam (LTTE).26 By the end of 2002, the parties agreed "to 
explore a political solution founded on internal self-determination 
based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka."27 While the 
road to such a political solution remains a rocky one, it is likely that 
these political developments affected the number of Sri Lankans who 
had credible fear interviews after FY 2001. 
The movement of Cubans into the United States through the 
southern border has resulted in Cubans becoming an important part 
of the credible fear process. Following serious enforcement measures 
targeting speedboat entries in the late 1990s, Cubans appear to have 
developed legal ways to travel to Mexico and perhaps Central 
American countries.28 Smuggling operations may also have played a 
role in this development. In any event, once in Mexico, Cubans have 
found their way to the land ports of entry and requested admission to 
the United States. As of June 2004, Cubans were the largest group to 
receive credible fear interviews in FY 2004, more than twice as large 
as the number two nationality (China) and more than six times as 
large as the number three nationality (Haiti).29 Haitians have been 
heavily discouraged from coming to the United States by the Bush 
Administration and may not have the option of reaching U.s. land 
ports of entry as do some Cubans. 
Several additional factors explain why numbers have 
decreased so significantly post-September 11, after having steadily 
and significantly increased until that point. Since the terrorist 
attacks, the American government has more actively controlled 
admission at the air ports of entry, where asylum seekers have often 
26. Press Release, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Announcement 
of Sri Lanka ceasefire (Feb. 22, 2002), at http://odin.dep.no/ud/engelsk/aktuelU 
presseml032171-070011/dok-bn.html (statement of Jan Petersen, Foreign 
Minister of Norway) (last visited Jan. 26,2005). 
27. Press Release, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Breakthrough in 
Sri Lanka Peace Negotiations (Dec. 5, 2002), at http://odin.dep.no/ud/engelsk/ 
aktueltlpresseml032171-990029/dok-bu.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2005). 
28. Telephone Interview with U.S. official at the Dep't of Homeland 
Security (Sept. 1, 2004). 
29. Credible Fear Determinations FY 2004, supra note 16. 
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sought entry.30 The international public is aware of this, and 
potential asylum seekers may have become increasingly afraid to 
travel with fraudulent documentation or without documents 
altogether as compared to before September 11th. Furthermore, the 
American government has increased its pre-screening activities at 
airports abroad. U.s. immigration officials examine airline 
passengers and their documents while they are waiting to board 
their flights. In addition, fewer people may have considered the 
United States a haven for refugees in light of the public efforts to 
tighten access to domestic borders. 
The enforcement focus has been pervasive. In March 2003, 
DHS announced Operation Liberty Shield, an initiative targeted at 
increasing security for Americans through various measures, 
including increased border security.31 With regard to asylum seekers, 
the initiative required the detention of applicants from nations where 
al-Qaeda, or other terrorist groups, are known to have operated, for 
the duration of their processing period.32 Previously, asylum seekers 
were only held beyond an initial screening period on a case-by-case 
basis. In April 2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a 
precedent decision ordering that a Haitian asylum seeker who 
arrived in the United States by boat despite interdiction efforts by 
the Coast Guard be held without bond. Citing national security 
concerns, Ashcroft reversed the BIA ruling calling for his release on a 
$2,500 bond while his asylum claim was pending.33 Similarly, in 
2003, federal prosecutors in South Florida began cracking down on 
asylum seekers by criminally charging those who entered the United 
30. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Dep't 
of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Actions 
Taken Since 9/11 (Sept. 17, 2004), at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/ 
fact_sheetsl09172004.xml (last visited Jan. 26, 2005). 
31. Secretary Tom Ridge, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, Press Briefing 
on Operation Liberty Shield, (Mar. 18, 2003), at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspubliC/ 
display?content=525 (last visited Jan. 26, 2005). 
32. Operation Liberty Shield was announced and then cancelled within a 
short time. Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, Remarks by 
Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge to the National Press Club (April 29, 
2003) available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=582 (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2005). 
33. In re D-J, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 574 (A.G. 2003). 
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States with false documents.34 This marks a reversal of previous U.S. 
policy deferring to the U.N. Refugee Convention, which states that 
member countries cannot impose penalties on asylum seekers who 
present themselves without delay and show good cause for their 
illegal entry. The Convention policy is based on concerns that false 
documentation might be the only means of escape for many asylum 
seekers.35 
In 2004, DHS instituted the US-VISIT program, which is 
intended to verify the identity of visitors to the United States 
through a biometric digital fingerscan and photograph system.36 
Visitors' fingerprints are collected overseas at consular visa posts and 
checked against a database of known criminals and suspected 
terrorists. These fingerprints are then verified upon arrival at a port 
of entry in the United States.37 Currently, US-VISIT requires 
fingerprinting of most non-U.S. citizens traveling to the United 
States on a visa, including most students, business travelers, and 
tourists. By September 30, 2004, the requirement will be extended to 
include visitors traveling under the Visa Waiver Program.38 
Furthermore, the DHS budget for FY 2005 significantly 
increases funding for screening procedures and detention, removal, 
34. Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-Loehr, Detaining and Criminalizing 
Asylum Seekers, 8 Bender's Immigr. Bull. 764 (May 1, 2003). 
35. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted July 28, 1951, 
art. 31, 19 U.S.T. 6259,6275,189 U.N.T.S. 137, 174 (entered into force Apr. 22, 
1954). The Ninth Circuit agreed with the longstanding U.S. position, pointing out 
that the BIA has clearly distinguished between the use of fraudulent documents 
to establish an asylum claim and the use of such documents for the purpose of 
escaping immediate danger from an alien's country of origin. The second purpose 
does not destroy an asylum claim. Akinmade v. INS, 196 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 
1999) (quoting In re O-D-, Interim Decision 3334, 1998 WL 24904 (BIA Jan. 20, 
2003». 
36. U. S. Dep't of Homeland Security, US-VISIT, at http://www.dhs.gov/ 
dhspubliC/interapp/content_multUmage/content_multUmage_0006.xm1 (last 
visited Jan. 26, 2005). 
37. Id. 
38. See id. The visa waiver program (VWP) allows foreign nationals of 
twenty-seven enumerated countries to be admitted to the United States for 
tourism or business for up to ninety days without a visa. U.S. Dep't of State, Visa 
Waiver Program, at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspubliC/interapp/editoriaVeditoriaC 
0527.xml (Jan. 26, 2005). 
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and enforcement proceedings. The new budget calls for $411 million 
in new funding to maintain and enhance border security activities.39 
This includes an increase of $12 million over the FY 2004 funding to 
continue expansion of the US-VISIT system and an increase of $20.6 
million to support the CBP Targeting Systems, which aid in 
identifying high-risk cargo and passengers.40 The budget also 
provides for an increase of $186 million to fund improvements in 
immigration enforcement, including a $108 million increase for the 
detention and removal of illegal aliens and an increase of $78 million 
for detecting and locating individuals in the United States who are in 
violation of immigration laws.41 Overall, the U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) budget increases by almost ten percent 
over FY 2004.42 
In light of the significant decrease in the number of asylum 
seekers identified in the expedited removal process, it is critical to 
know whether Immigration Inspectors are recognizing all those who 
legitimately fear return to their home countries. Both the Clinton 
and Bush administrations made it impossible for an independent, 
non-governmental observer to answer that question, as neither 
allowed any independent expert study of the expedited removal 
system. Only three agencies have been permitted to examine certain 
aspects of the inspection process in the expedited removal system. 
Examining the first seven months of the new expedited removal 
system, the United States General Accounting Office performed 
random documentation checks and found "mixed results as to 
whether inspectors and supervisors were consistently documenting 
that they followed various steps in INS' expedited removal process."43 
39. Press Release, U.s. Dep't of Homeland Security, Department of 
Homeland Security Announces FY 2005 Budget in Brief (Feb. 2, 2004), at 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspubliddisplay?content=3133 (last visited Jan. 26, 2005). 
40. [d. 
41. [d. 
42. [d. 
43. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Report to Congo Comms., Illegal Aliens: 
Changes in the Process of Denying Aliens Entry Into the United States, 
GAO/GGD-98-81, at 38 (1998), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/ 
gg98081.pdf. 
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More recently, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) conducted a limited, confidential study on 
expedited removal for DHS, which was completed in October 2003.44 
The New York Times obtained a copy ofUNHCR's report from a non-
UN official concerned about the expansion of expedited removal 
powers to the Border Patrol announced in August 2004. According to 
the New York Times,45 UNHCR found that most airport inspectors 
properly identified asylum seekers and correctly referred them for 
credible fear interviews, but important problems existed. Many 
inspectors held negative views of asylum seekers, considering them 
to be frauds. The report concluded that this attitude resulted in 
instances where inspectors intimidated asylum seekers or treated 
them with derision. At John F. Kennedy International Airport in 
New York, inspectors routinely handcuffed asylum seekers and 
restrained them with belly chains and leg restraints. In one instance 
there, inspectors ordered a Liberian asylum seeker to remove his 
clothes to determine whether he had scars consistent with torture 
and then allegedly ridiculed him with racial and sexual taunts. The 
report described two instances in which inspectors encouraged 
asylum seekers not to pursue asylum claims. UNHCR also reported 
that inspectors often failed to provide certified translators for those 
who did not speak English, improperly notified consulates about the 
identity and detention of asylum seekers, and in fourteen cases 
mistakenly concluded that individuals who expressed a credible fear 
of persecution were not entitled to apply for asylum.46 
The return of refugees to serious harm is very troubling, even 
in isolated occurrences. UNHCR's study, as reported by the New 
York Times, is a limited examination of the inspection process. As 
DHS proceeds to expand expedited removal, however, it is critical 
that this part of the process becomes transparent. DHS officials say 
that they have responded to the problems UNHCR identified and 
that Border Patrol officials will be better trained to protect asylum 
44. The author requested a copy of that report from DRS, but was informed 
that it is not for public release. Telephone Interview with DRS official at ICE 
(Sept. 1, 2004). 
45. Rachel L. Swarns, U.N. Report Cites Harassment at American Airports 
of Asylum Seekers, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13,2004, at All. 
46. [d. 
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seekers. Yet, the public must have confidence that these problems 
have been addressed and that the training is effective. 
Currently, the U.S. Commission on International Religious 
Freedom is completing an extensive study of the impact of expedited 
removal on asylum seekers.47 Monitors observed the secondary 
inspection process at several key expedited removal sites on a full-
time basis over a few weeks. The final report is expected to be 
released in January 2005.48 That study should shed light on the 
inspection of asylum seekers in expedited removal and provide for 
ways to address any identified problems. 
B. Recommendations for Reforming Expedited Removal As 
Applied to Asylum Seekers 
DRS should take three steps to ensure that the inspection 
system is identifYing those who fear return. First, the agency should 
conduct its own systematic review of secondary inspection in the 
context of expedited removal. Second, DRS should videotape the 
process for quality control purposes. This is already being done in at 
least one site, but should be expanded nationally. Finally, the U.S. 
Commission on International Religious Freedom did not use actual 
testers to determine how well the process is working. DHS should 
allow for independent testing of the secondary inspection process in 
expedited removal. By taking these steps, DRS will be able to build 
public confidence in its capacity to protect refugees. 
With regard to those individuals referred by inspectors to 
Asylum Officers, almost all who have received a credible fear 
determination have met the credible fear requirements and 
participate in full hearing proceedings before an Immigration Judge, 
as discussed below.49 This has not changed since September 11, 200l. 
Of those cases where credible fear was decided, ninety-eight percent 
of asylum seekers met the requirements in FY 2000, and ninety-nine 
47. U.S. Comm'n on Int'l Religious Freedom, Annual Report of the U.S. 
Commission on International Religious Freedom (2004), available at 
http://www.uscirf.gov/reportS/12May04l2004annuaIRpt.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 
2005). 
48. Interview with official at the U.S. Comm'n on Int'l Religious Freedom 
(Sept. 28, 2004). 
49. Credible Fear Determinations FY 1997-2003, supra note 15. 
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percent in FY 2001, FY 2002, and FY 2003.50 Through three quarters 
of FY 2004, only seventeen of some 4500 asylum seekers have been 
found not to have a credible fear. 51 
While those concerned that the credible fear requirements 
are too lax argue that they should be tightened, such a change risks 
returning refugees to countries of persecution in violation of U.S. 
international obligations and domestic law. Since U.S. officials are 
placing almost all of these individuals into immigration court 
proceedings in order to ensure that the United States lives up to its 
protection commitments, the government should return to the pre-
expedited removal policy and place individuals seeking asylum 
directly into Immigration Court proceedings without spending the 
valuable time of Asylum Officers and Immigration Judges on credible 
fear determinations. This is particularly called for given that the 
United States has implemented a reasonably efficient and effective 
asylum system, as more fully detailed below. 
II. REFUGEES SEEKING AsYLUM THROUGH AsYLUM OFFICER 
INTERVIEWS 
Asylum determinations are decisions made by sovereign 
states as to whether an individual's claim for refugee status is valid. 
Generally, a grant of asylum enables a refugee to remain in the host 
country, often permanently. To qualify for asylum, an asylum seeker 
must meet the requirements of the refugee definition set forth in the 
1951 UN Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol as implemented 
by domestic laws.52 Procedures governing these individualized 
50. Id. 
51. Credible Fear Determinations FY 2004, supra note 16. 
52. Immigration and Nationality Act §§ (101)(a)(42) and 208, 8 U.S.C. §§ 
1101(a)(42) and 1158, respectively. As the Supreme Court stated in I.N.S. v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987), "[i)f one thing is clear from the 
legislative history of the new definition of 'refugee,' and indeed the entire 1980 
[Refugee) Act, it is that one of Congress' primary purposes was to bring United 
States refugee law into coriformance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, to which the 
United States acceded in 1968." See also U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services, History of the United States Asylum Officer Corps, § I(b), at 
http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/asylum/history.htm (last modified Sept. 9, 
2003). 
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determinations vary among states and include both adversarial and 
non-adversarial proceedings and appeals. The substantive and 
procedural law of asylum is complex, making the process a very 
challenging one for those asylum seekers who do not have legal 
representation, experience the proceedings through translation, 
generally fear interactions with government officials, and may be 
held in detention. The challenges to decision-makers are also 
considerable. Decision-makers must understand the human rights 
conditions in the countries from which asylum seekers flee. They also 
need detailed information on the persecution feared or experienced 
by the asylum seeker. Many states have faced significant problems in 
operating fair and efficient asylum systems particularly when they 
receive very large numbers of applications. However, reforms have 
enabled certain states to develop systems that reasonably balance 
the refugee's interest in protection and the state's interest in 
minimizing abuse. 
In assessing whether an individual has a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of race, nationality, religion, social group, or 
political opinion, decision-makers examine both objective conditions 
in the country of origin and the individual's particular situation. 
Decision-makers need access to current human rights information to 
understand country conditions. They also must ascertain information 
from the asylum seeker about their fear of persecution. This can be 
challenging since refugees often have to leave their countries 
precipitously and thus rarely bring with them documentation of their 
plight. If applicants do produce documentation, it is often difficult for 
the decision maker to ascertain its authenticity. As discussed below, 
the credibility of the asylum seeker often becomes the critical issue in 
determining eligibility for refugee status. 
Proof of the claimant's fear of persecution is one of the major 
challenges in asylum determinations. Unless the asylum seeker is a 
high profile dissident, newspaper accounts concerning her political 
activities likely do not exist. Women raped as part of a policy of 
ethnic cleansing are unlikely to have medical records of any post-
traumatic hospitalization. The claimant's testimony is most often the 
major evidence available to the decision-maker in determining 
eligibility for refugee status. Decision-makers are faced with 
assessing the credibility of that testimony. They often look for 
sufficient and plausible details that support the claim and make 
sense in relation to the human rights situation in a particular 
country. But what does it mean if the claimant provides different 
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dates (days or months) for certain important events described? What 
if the claimant relates his or her history in a halting manner? Or 
does not look the decision-maker in the eye when providing 
testimony? Are these indicators of untruthfulness? Some decision-
makers interpret these actions as such; others do not. Considerable 
cultural knowledge is needed to interpret the behavior of asylum 
applicants who come from all over the world. Difficulties in 
remembering dates are a common problem for victims of persecution. 
Given these challenges, we now examine the first stage of 
actual asylum determinations, where asylum seekers voluntarily 
come forward to the DRS and file a claim, knowing that they will be 
placed into removal proceedings if they are not successful and have 
no pre-existing legal immigration status in the United States.53 The 
vast majority of asylum seekers enter the U.S. asylum system in this 
"affirmative" manner.54 
A. The State of the Affirmative Asylum System in the United 
States 
In evaluating the state of the affirmative asylum system in 
the United States, some important overview questions must be 
addressed. First, how many individuals voluntarily come forward 
and identify themselves to the government in the hopes that they 
will obtain asylum? Following the major reforms implemented in 
January 1995, the numbers declined, then rose, and are now 
declining again. New affirmative asylum claims55 numbered 
somewhat under 50,000 in FY 1996 and 1997 (see Chart 2).56 The 
53. Most asylum claimants who come forward have no legal immigration 
status in the United States. U.S. Headquarters Asylum Div., Dep't of Homeland 
Security, Asylum by Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003 (2004) [hereinafter 
Asylum by Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003J (on file with author). 
54. See generally U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Obtaining 
Asylum in the United States: Two Paths to Asylum, at 
httpj/uscis.gov/graphicsiservicesiasylum/paths.htm (last modified Nov. 29, 2004). 
55. U.S. officials maintain data based on the number of claims. One claim 
represents more than one individual where a spouse and children accompany the 
principal claimant. 
56. Asylum by Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003, supra note 53. 
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Chart 2. Affirmative Asylum Claims, Asylum Office, 1996·2004 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Source: Headquarters Asylum Division, Office of Refugee, Asylum, and International 
Operations, uscrs, DHS 
number of claims dropped to 34,000 and 31,000 in FY 1998 and 1999, 
respectively. 57 Asylum seekers filed almost 40,000 claims in FY 2000 
and then almost 59,000 claims in FY 2001.58 Asylum seekers filed 
about the same number during the fiscal year following September 
11th. 59 Some 43,000 asylum seekers filed affirmative claims in FY 
2003, more than twenty-five percent less than the previous fiscal 
year.60 In FY 2004, that number is on track to drop another thirty-
five percent to about 28,000 cases.61 That will set a new record low. 
Second, from what countries have asylum seekers come? 
China, Colombia, and Haiti have been the three largest groups by far 
prior to and after September 11th.62 However, the number of Chinese 
57. [d. 
58. [d. 
59. [d. 
60. [d. 
61. U.S. Headquarters Asylum Div., Dep't of Homeland Security, Asylum 
2004 QS Top 50 (2004) [hereinafter Asylum 2004 QS Top 50] (on file with author). 
62. Asylum by Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003, supra note 53. 
Mexicans have voluntarily entered the affirmative asylum system in large 
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numbers during this period principally in order to be placed into Immigration 
Court proceedings where they can seek relief other than asylum. Since they are 
generally not seeking asylum, they are not included in the analysis articulated in 
this article. The USCIS Asylum Office explains this phenomenon as follows: 
Evidence strongly suggests that most Mexican asylum 
applicants have been using the USCIS asylum program as a 
conduit to enter into removal proceedings. Once in removal 
proceedings, these individuals typically withdraw their 
respective asylum applications and file applications for another 
immigration benefit (cancellation of removal), which can only 
be filed in removal proceedings. Upon filing for cancellation of 
removal, they become eligible to receive employment 
authorization because, unlike the asylum process, the 
cancellation of removal process allows individuals to apply for 
and receive employment authorization immediately upon 
submission of an application for cancellation of removal while 
their applications are pending, without regard to how long the 
cancellation of removal application has been pending. 
Moreover, by withdrawing their asylum applications, 
these individuals remove themselves from the court's fast-track 
calendar for asylum cases, which is based on the 180-day 
deadline by which asylum applications must be adjudicated 
before individuals receive employment authorization. The 
Department of Justice first instituted this fast-track system in 
1995 as part of a comprehensive reform of the asylum system, 
creating a more efficient and effective process that denies non-
meritorious claims quickly without discouraging legitimate 
refugees. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) later codified this 180-day 
deadline, requiring the Department to adjudicate asylum 
applications filed on or after April 1, 1997 within 180 days from 
the date of filing. See section 208(d)(5)(A)(iii) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 
1158(d)(5)(A)(iii). To provide the Immigration Court with 
sufficient time to meet this statutory 180-day deadline for 
cases filed affirmatively with USCIS and later referred to 
Immigration Court, the USCIS's asylum program has 
established a policy aimed at completing the vast majority of 
its referrals within 60 days from the date of filing-making the 
affirmative asylum process a very quick access point to removal 
proceedings. 
In the last several years, however, the USCIS asylum 
program has seen significant drops in asylum applications filed 
by Mexican nationals from 9,316 filed in FY 2002 to 4,111 filed 
in FY 2003. In FY 2004, the program anticipates receiving 
approximately 1,500 asylum applications. The exact reasons 
for this decline in receipts is currently unknown, although we 
believe the decline may be related to local law enforcement 
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and Colombian affirmative asylum seekers decreased precipitously in 
FY 2003.63 Nothing has changed in these countries to suggest that 
fewer asylum seekers would make claims in the United States; 
however, the policies and practices instituted by the U.S. government 
have probably affected these numbers, as discussed further below. 
Other significant nationalities in the affirmative asylum system 
before September 11th include Somalia, EI Salvador, Indonesia, 
Armenia, Ethiopia, and India.64 In FY 2002, Somalia numbers 
decreased significantly and have remained small since.65 Asylum 
seekers from Cameroon have applied in larger numbers beginning in 
FY 2002.66 During the first three quarters of FY 2004, Venezuelan 
asylum seekers have applied in larger numbers.67 These nationality 
changes may very well reflect shifts in home country instability, 
among other factors. 
Why are the overall numbers down? Are asylum seekers 
more afraid to identify themselves voluntarily to U.S. government 
officials in a post-September 11th climate that emphasizes 
enforcement and removal rather than protection? Are fewer asylum 
seekers finding ways to come to the United States because of tighter 
controls? Are fewer considering the United States a haven for 
refugees? These are all serious possibilities and constitute the best 
hypothesis this author has so far developed to explain this major 
decrease. 
Those who have come forward voluntarily have fared 
differently in their quest for protection. As Chart 3 shows, the 
Asylum Officer approval rates have decreased significantly since FY 
actions in California that have resulted in the prosecution of 
several unscrupulous preparers who have advised Mexican 
nationals in the U.S. to manipulate the asylum program in the 
manner described above, as well as local publicity campaigns to 
inform the community of these illegal practices. 
Email from U.S. Headquarters Asylum Division, Department of Homeland 
Security, to Andrew I. Schoenholtz (Aug. 26. 2004) (on file with author). 
63. Asylum by Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003, supra note 53. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Asylum FY 2004 QS Top 50, supra note 61. 
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2002.68 Approval rates are down from more than 50% in FY 2000 and 
2001 to about 40% in FY 2003 and 2004 (through June 30).69 
In terms of the three largest nationalities, the Chinese approval 
rates have decreased significantly in FY 2003 and 2004, and the 
Colombian rates did so beginning in FY 2002.70 The Chinese rates 
fell from above to below average rates-from 55%, 64%, and 60% 
approval rates in FY 2000, 2001, and 2002, respectively, to 45% and 
36% in FY 2003 and 2004, respectively.71 Colombian rates fell 
significantly as well, though they remain above average-from 68% 
and 62% in FY 2000 and 2001, respectively, to 45%,46%, and 48% in 
FY 2002, 2003, and 2004.72 Finally, the Haitian rates increased from 
22% in 2000 to 36% in 2001 and have held in the 31-37% range 
since.73 At one point well below average, the Haitians are now only 
somewhat below average. The significant drop in Chinese and 
Colombian approval rates certainly contributes in an important 
manner to the overall decline-these two nationalities accounted for 
36% of the merits decisions in FY 2002, 29% in FY 2003, and 20% in 
FY 2004.74 
68. U.S. Headquarters Asylum Div., Dep't of Homeland Security, Asylum 
Approval Rates by Office FY 2000-2004 (2004) (on file with author). 
69. In calculating the approval rates, the author only considers decisions on 
the substantive merits of the asylum case: did an Asylum Officer determine that 
an individual did or did not have a bona fide asylum claim? Accordingly, the 
calculation divides the number of grants by the number of grants, denials, and 
referrals to Immigration Court based on an interview. Individuals referred to the 
Immigration Court on procedural grounds for not having met the one-year 
application deadline are not considered as decisions on the merits of the refugee 
claim itself. The USC IS Asylum Office does include the one-year referrals in their 
approval rate calculations as it is an eligibility requirement. 
70. Asylum by Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003, supra note 53; 
Asylum FY 2004 QS Top 50, supra note 61. 
71. Asylum by Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003, supra note 53; 
Asylum FY 2004 QS Top 50, supra note 61. 
72. Asylum by Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003, supra note 53; 
Asylum FY 2004 QS Top 50, supra note 61. 
73. Asylum by Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003, supra note 53; 
Asylum FY 2004 QS Top 50, supra note 61. 
74. Asylum by Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003, supra note 53; 
Asylum FY 2004 QS Top 50, supra note 61. 
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Chart 3. Asylum Office Approval Rates, 2000·2004 
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Source: Headquarters Asylum Division, Office of Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations, USCIS, DHS 
What accounts for these major declines in the approval rates 
of Chinese and Colombian asylum seekers? Again, nothing 
significant has changed regarding the human rights and conflict 
context in these countries. With regard to those seeking asylum 
based on coercive population control, for example, are Asylum 
Officers finding applicants less credible than in the past? With 
regard to Colombians, did more of the earlier arrivals flee 
persecution as opposed to civil conflict? The data do not answer these 
questions, and no information clearly suggests that such possibilities 
are true. However, one of the weaknesses in the U.S. protection 
system is that there is no fair and effective mechanism to provide 
individuals with temporary protection during civil conflict. This 
protection gap may be significant and is discussed further below. 
The decline in Chinese and Colombian approval rates does 
not completely account for the more than 20% decline in the overall 
asylum approval rate. Statistics regarding nationalities also do not 
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reveal any major changes in terms of the types of countries from 
which asylum seekers originate. They are generally countries where 
conflict, instability, and/or human rights violations force many to flee 
from persecution and other serious forms of harm. It is possible that 
some Asylum Officers became less generous in their decision-making 
post September 11th, particularly with regard to the most difficult 
decisions involving asylum seekers fleeing states in the midst of 
terrible civil wars. The 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, 
of course, do not protect those fleeing civil conflict, and the United 
States does not yet practice the system common in Europe whereby 
those denied asylum are provided with a temporary form of 
protection if they are fleeing conflict. 
With regard to other possible factors, gender does not appear 
to account for the overall decline.75 The percentage of women 
applying for asylum did not change significantly from FY 1999-
2003.76 About 38% of applicants have been female in each of these 
recent fiscal years. Neither does representation account for this 
decline-or more precisely the lack of representation, since 65-70% 
of asylum seekers in the first instance have not been represented 
during FY 1999-2003.77 
The data do reveal that the approval rates at two of the eight 
Asylum Offices decreased significantly more than other offices. As 
Chart 4 shows, Los Angeles declined from a high of 67% in FY 2001 
to a low of 31% in FY 2004. Houston decreased from a 44% approval 
rate in FY 2001 to an 18% rate in 2003, and reached a 23% rate in 
2004.78 It is not clear what factors influenced those major declines, 
but such significant changes should be fully investigated. 
Even with the decline in approval rates, the affirmative 
asylum system remains robust: 40% of those whose full claims are 
75. U.S. Headquarters Asylum Div., Dep't of Homeland Security, 
Affirmative Asylum Applications by Gender FY 1998-2003 (2004) (on file with 
author). 
76. [d. 
77. U.S. Headquarters Asylum Division, Dep't of Homeland Security, All 
Offices Summary, Reform, By Representation, FY 1999-2003 (2004) (on file with 
author). 
78. U.S. Headquarters Asylum Division, Dep't of Homeland Security, 
Asylum Approval Rates by Office FY 2000-2004 (2004) (on file with author). 
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heard in the first instance receive asylum.79 Compared to pre-reform, 
the system continues to provide protection to a significant number of 
refugees at this first stage. 
Chart 4. Asylum Approval Rates, Los Angeles and Houston Offices, 2001 v. 2004 
[fIIlI2001 1m 2004 [ 
Los Angeles Houston 
Source: Headquarters Asylum Division, Office of Refugee, Asylum, and 
International Operations, USCIS, DRS 
B. Recommendations to Improve Affirmative Asylum 
The robust asylum rate does not mean that the system is as 
good as it should be. The one-year deadline requirement was a major 
problem for many applicants prior the terrorist attacks and remains 
a major challenge. Pursuant to a 1996 law, the United States 
requires applicants to file for asylum within one year of the 
claimant's arrival in the country.80 The only exceptions to this rule 
are changed circumstances that materially affect the applicant's 
79. Asylum by Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003, supra note 53. 
80. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 8 C.F.R. § 208.4 
(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1996). 
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Chart 5. One-Year Deadline Referrals by Asylum. Office to Immigration Court, 
2000-2003 
2000 2001 2002 2003 
Source: Headquarters Asylum Division, Office of Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations, users, DHS 
eligibility for asylumS1 or extraordinary circumstances relating to the 
delay in filing.82 The data shows that this procedural requirement 
has disqualified large numbers of persecution claims from 
consideration by decision-makers. As Chart 5 shows, since 2000 the 
DRS Asylum Office has referred more than 25,000 asylum seekers to 
Immigration Court because they did not meet the one-year 
application deadline.83 Clearly, very high numbers of people do not 
have their substantive claims heard in the first instance. While this 
problem pre-dates the terrorist attacks, the situation has only 
worsened since September 11th. 
Those who object to such time limits argue that genuine 
refugees often have good reasons for failing to file their claims 
81. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 8 C.F.R. § 208.4 
(a)(4) (1996). 
82. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 8 C.F.R. § 208.4 
(a)(5) (1996). 
83. U.S. Headquarters Div., Dep't of Homeland Security, 1 Year Deadline 
Rejections by Asylum Office 1998-2004 (2004) (on file with author). These 
numbers do not include Mexicans who entered the affirmative asylum system to 
be placed into removal proceedings in order to apply for other forms of relief. 
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immediately or soon after arrival. Many refugees are traumatized. 
Unless they are in countries that provide them with food and shelter, 
their first priority is survival-finding relatives, friends, or others of 
all, filing an asylum application that survives referral is 
extraordinarily difficult without help from a lawyer or other who will 
help them. Language barriers, as well as ignorance ofthe law, hinder 
compliance with such deadlines. Perhaps most important 
professional who specializes in asylum law. There is no evidence that 
the imposition of time limits decreases abusive claims. As discussed 
above, it is clear, however, that such restrictions limit the access of 
bona fide claimants to a decision on the merits. The 1996 U.S. law 
has now limited the rights of tens of thousands of individuals to seek 
asylum.84 
If an asylum system is effective, the imposition of time limits 
and expedited processes is not needed to control abuse. If viewed in 
sum, the U.S. asylum system is generally an effective one. Decisions 
are made in a timely fashion: two separate decisions, by Asylum 
Officers and Immigration Judges, are made in most affirmative cases 
within six months of the application's receipt at the Asylum Office.85 
Furthermore, approval rates are significant and those denied asylum 
often come from countries in civil conflict. This indicates that 
significant abuse is not the problem it was prior to the 1995 reforms. 
Accordingly, the United States should eliminate the time deadline or, 
in the very least, impose a very generous one, such as five years. 
The U.S. government and all other stakeholders in the 
affirmative asylum system should be troubled by the significant 
decreases in both the absolute number of applicants and the grant 
rate. By and large, the circumstances that propelled forced migrants 
to the United States have not changed. While the overall grant rate 
84. See Asylum By Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003, supra note 53; 
1 Year Deadline Rejections by Asylum Office FY 1998--2004, supra note 83. As 
discussed above, the Asylum Office has rejected more than 25,000 claims based 
on this artificial deadline. While some of these asylum seekers may find relief 
under withholding of removal or the Convention Against Torture, these 
alternative forms of relief require significantly greater proof to demonstrate 
eligibility. In any event, unless an Immigration Judge overturns the Asylum 
Officer rejection based on the deadline, asylum is not available. 
85. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Frequently Asked Questions 
About Asylum, at http://uscis.gov/graphicslserviceslasylumlfaq.htm#how9 (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2004). 
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is still relatively high, access and protection problems are of 
considerable concern. American immigration officials need to 
understand this decline more thoroughly to be able to address the 
problems of access and protection. 
III. REFUGEES SEEKING AsYLUM IN REGULAR IMMIGRATION COURT 
HEARINGS 
Asylum claims are also decided in Immigration Court, which 
has been part of the Justice Department's Executive Office for 
Immigration Review (EOIR) since 1983.86 Most of the claims are 
referred by USCIS Asylum Officers.87 On average, from 1999 to 2003, 
about seventy-two percent of asylum claims filed in Immigration 
Court came from this "affirmative" system.88 Asylum seekers who 
have not voluntarily come forward to request protection may also 
raise a claim after they are placed in removal proceedings. Such 
"defensive" claims accounted for the other asylum cases in 
Immigration Court.89 
In the last five years, the number of asylum claims first 
decreased slightly, then increased significantly, and finally 
decreased. The number of asylum cases increased twenty percent in 
FY 2002 to about 74,000, and then decreased twelve percent in FY 
2003 to some 65,000.90 Given the decline in the number of affirmative 
asylum cases, the number of Immigration Court asylum claims will 
continue to decrease. 
In contrast to the declining grant rates in Asylum Officer 
decisions, Immigration Judge grant rates have held relatively steady 
86. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Mission, and Functions Manual: Executive Office 
for Immigration Review (March 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
jmd/mps/manuaVeoir.htm. 
87. EOIR Office of Planning and Analysis, Dep't of Justice, FY 2003 
Statistical Yearbook, at 11 (2004) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
eoir/statspub/fy03syb.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2004) [hereinafter FY 2003 
Statistical Yearbook]. 
88. [d. 
89. U.s. Citizenship and Immigration Services, supra note 54. 
90. Asylum by Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003, supra note 53. 
HeinOnline -- 36 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 348 2004-2005
348 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LA W REVIEW [36:323 
from 2000 to 2003.91 The approval rate has increased significantly 
since the 1995 asylum reforms.92 Almost four out of every ten 
decisions (grants and denials) are grants.93 In fact, the approval rate 
of the affirmative (Asylum Officer) cases referred to' Immigration 
Court was forty-four percent during FY 2001-2003, considerably 
higher than the defensive grant rate-even including one-year 
deadline referrals from the Asylum Office (see Chart 6).94 
. Thus, when merits determinations are made in the first two 
instances, the U.S. asylum system continues to be quite robust. The 
Asylum Officer approval rate in FY 2003 was around forty-one 
percent,95 and the Immigration Court about thirty-seven percent.96 
With regard to decision making since the terrorist attacks, the 
Immigration Judges continue to grant the same proportion of 
referred cases as they did previously.97 Unfortunately, without 
longitudinal data, analysts cannot draw any conclusions about how 
Immigration Judges evaluate the merits of first instance decisions. 
Since such feedback to Asylum Officers would be very useful, EOIR 
91. FY 2003 Statistical Yearbook, supra note 87, at Kl. 
92. See EOIR Office of Planning and Analysis, Dep't of Justice, 
Immigration Courts FY 1997 Asylum Statistics, available at http:// 
www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoiaIFY97AsyStats.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2004); 
Immigration Courts FY 1998 Asylum Statistics, available at http:// 
www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoiaIFY98AsyStats.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2004); 
Immigration Courts FY 1999 Asylum Statistics, available at http:// 
www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoiaIFY99AsyStats.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2004); 
Immigration Courts FY 2000 Asylum Statistics, available at http:// 
www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoiaIFYOOAsyStats.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2004); 
Immigration Courts FY 2001 Asylum Statistics, available at http:// 
www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoiaIFY01AsyStats.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2004); 
Immigration Courts FY 2002 Asylum Statistics, available at http:// 
www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoiaIFY02AsyStats.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2004); 
Immigration Courts FY 2003 Asylum S~atistics, available at http:// 
www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoiaIFY03AsyStats.pdf(lastvisitedNov. 20, 2004). 
93. FY 2003 Statistical Yearbook, supra note 87, at Kl. 
94. [d. at K2. 
95. U.S. Headquarters Asylum Div., Dep't of Homeland Security, Asylum 
Office FY 2003 (2004) (on file with author). 
96. FY 2003 Statistical Yearbook, supra note 87, at Kl. 
97. [d. 
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Chart 6. Affirmative and Defensive Grant Rates, Immigration Court, 2001-2003 
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and the Asylum Office should develop a system to track individuals 
through all the administrative decisions. 
With respect to other nationality trends, five countries 
consistently topped the list in absolute number of grants in FY 2001, 
2002, and 2003: China, Colombia, Albania, India and Haiti (see 
Chart 7).98 In FY 2002 and 2003, refugees from these five countries 
accounted for more than fifty percent of all grants.99 Since September 
11th, most of the top fifteen nationalities granted asylum have 
remained in that top grouping. Only Sri Lankans and Somalis 
declined in number, as the number of asylum applicants from those 
countries decreased.10o As suggested previously, these changes may 
reflect, among other factors, relative improvements in the stability of 
98. Asylum by Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003, supra note 53. 
Several of these countries also ranked among the top five in absolute number of 
denials in FY 2001, 2002, and 2003 (see Chart 8). 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
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Chart 7. Asylum Applications Granted by Immigration Court, 1999-2003 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Source: DOJ, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Asylum Statistics, 1999-2003 
Note: Grants include conditional grants of Chinese asylum seekers. 
these two countries, but they may also reflect greater scrutiny of visa 
applications and efforts at border control. 
With respect to nationality, China has been at the very top in 
grants and applications for a number of years.lOl Due to the 
Congressional limit of 1,000 grants per year to those fleeing coercive 
population control, even just halfway through FY 2004 there was a 
substantial and growing backlog of nearly 9,000 conditionally 
approved Chinese refugees awaiting a permanent grant.102 Because 
of the backlog, these individuals cannot become permanent residents 
and eventually citizens for significant periods of time. A Chinese 
refugee granted conditional asylum today will wait more than nine 
years before the grant becomes permanent. On top of that, these 
101. Asylum by Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003, supra note 53. 
102. The fiscal year runs from October through September. See supra note 
15. As of March 2004, EOIR reported to DRS that 8,954 Chinese with conditional 
grants of asylum awaited their permanent grant. Email from EOIR, Office of 
Planning, Analysis and Technology, Sept. 9, 2004 (on file with author). 
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refugees must then wait another decade or more on the asylum 
backlog for permanent resident status.103 
The lack of representation for asylum seekers in the 
adversarial proceedings of Immigration Court is also problematic. 
Representation matters in terms of outcomes. As this author found in 
a previous study, asylum seekers referred to Immigration Court by 
the Asylum Office are six times more likely to be granted asylum if 
they are represented.104 During FY 1999-2003, only forty-two to 
forty-eight percent of non-citizens had representation.105 Experts 
assert that represented cases generally make for a more efficient 
Immigration Court.106 Congress has so far failed to mandate 
representation, even for children in Immigration Court. In the very 
103. Current law enables those granted asylum to apply for permanent 
resident status one year after the grant, but limits the number of such 
adjustments to 10,000 per year. When Congress set that number in 1990 by 
doubling the initial ceiling established in the Refugee Act of 1980, it sufficiently 
addressed the needs at that time. Congress has yet to update the 1990 ceiling, 
even though U.S. society fully expects that those granted asylum are not 
returning to their home countries and will remain permanently in the United 
States. As of March 1, 2004, there were some 160,000 asylees awaiting 
adjustment. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Dep't of Homeland 
Security, Adjustment of Status for Asylees, at http://uscis.gov/graphics/ 
fieldoffices/nebraskalasyleeadj.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2004). USCIS estimated 
that the applications received in late 2003 would be processed in FY 2015. To 
help integrate these refugees into U.S. society and protect their rights, then, 
Congress should eliminate both of these artificial limitations on the number of 
asylum grants and status adjustments. In addition and to the same end, 
Congress should admit these and all other asylees as legal permanent residents 
upon the grant of asylum, as recommended by the Jordan Commission in 1997. 
The Jordan Commission recommended immediate adjustment for asylees and 
resettled refugees. U.S. Comm'n on Immigration Reform, U.S. Refugee Policy: 
Taking Leadership, 34, 35 (1997), http://www.utexas.edullbj/uscir/refugee/full-
report.pdf(last visited Jan. 26,2004). 
104. Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Jonathan Jacobs, The State of Asylum 
Representation: Ideas for Change, 16 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 739, 766 tbl.1 (2002). 
105. FY 2003 Statistical Yearbook, supra note 87, at G-l. This data is not 
broken down with respect tOctypes of cases, such as asylum. In FY 1999, sixty-
four percent of affirmative asylum seekers were represented in Immigration 
Court. Schoenholtz & Jacobs, supra note 103, at 742. 
106. See Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep't of Justice, 
BIA Pro Bono Project, at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/probonolMajorInitiatives.htm 
(last visited Jan. 26, 2005). 
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Chart 8. Asylum Applications Denied by Immigration Court, 1999-2003 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Source: DOJ, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Asylum Statistics 1999-2003 
least, Congress should fund a pilot study of mandated representation 
in several Immigration Courts to understand fully the benefits of 
such a system to the government and those it has committed to 
protect. 
In sum, the approval rates in Immigration Court have 
continued to be significant and consistent since September 11th. 
Major problems-such as artificial limits on the number of asylum 
grants and adjustments; and the lack of representation for asylum 
seekers-should be addressed by legislation. 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OF IMMIGRATION: IMPACT OF ATTORNEY 
GENERAL REFORMS AND PERSONNEL CHANGES AT THE BOARD OF 
IMMIGRATION APPEALS 
Asylum claimants, non-citizens seeking other forms of relief, 
and DHS Trial Attorneys may appeal an adverse Immigration Judge 
decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).107 Historically, 
107. Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Board 
of Immigration Appeals (biographical information on the BIA), at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoiribiainfo.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2004). 
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the BIA has been the single most important decision-maker in the 
immigration system. It reviews cases nationwide and sets precedents 
that Immigration Judges and Asylum Officers must follow. lOS Given 
that the Supreme Court issues very few decisions concerning asylum 
law, the BIA essentially interprets immigration law for the nation. 
While a United States Court of Appeals may disagree with a Board 
interpretation, the BIA only has to follow that Court's interpretation 
within its limited jurisdiction. 
The Attorney General, however, established the BIA by 
regulation and has the power to overrule its decisions. lo9 Prior to the 
1990s, the Attorney General generally did not exercise that power. 
That changed with both Janet Reno and John Ashcroft. In addition, 
the Attorney General has complete discretion to appoint and remove 
Board members. After September 11th, Attorney General John 
Ashcroft completely revamped the powers and composition of the BIA 
based on plans developed well before the terrorist attacks.110 
During the 1990s, Attorney General Janet Reno increased 
the size of the Board to address an increasing caseload,ll1 In doing 
so, she added members from academia, private practice, and 
advocacy in order to balance somewhat the predominant government 
experience of existing members.ll2 As the caseload continued to grow 
over the decade, a backlog developed despite the increased number of 
BIA members. In the most significant development of her governance 
of the BIA, the Attorney General authorized major changes in the 
108. Id. 
109. Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S, Dep't of Justice, Board 
of Immigration Appeals Practice Manual 10 (2004), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoirlbiaiqapracmanual/apptmtn4.htm. 
110, Press Release, Executive Office for Immigration Review, U,S, Dep't of 
Justice, Attorney General Issues Final Rule Reforming Board of Immigration 
Appeals Procedures (Aug, 23, 2002), http://www,usdoj,gov/eoir/pressl021 
BIARestruct,pdf(last visited Jan, 26, 2005), 
111, See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve 
Case Management, 67 Fed, Reg, 54,878, 54,878-54,879 (Aug, 26, 2002) 
[hereinafter Final Rule], 
112, Press Release, Executive Office for Immigration Review, U,S, Dep't of 
Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review Announces New Appointments 
at the Board of Immigration Appeals (July 31, 2000), at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/presslOOlbiaappts2000.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2005). 
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BIA review process to address this growing backlog. In October 1999, 
she gave BIA members the authority in certain circumstances to 
issue summary affirmances, that is, decisions without any 
analysis.l13 Instead of having every appeal decided by a three-
member panel, the BIA issued individual member summary 
affirmances in certain categories of cases designated by the BIA 
Chairman if the BIA member determined: 
that the result reached in the decision under review was 
correct; that any errors in the decision under review were 
harmless or nonmaterial; and that (A) The issues on appeal 
are squarely controlled by existing Board or federal court 
precedent and do not involve the application of precedent to 
a novel fact situation; or (B) the factual and legal issues 
raised on appeal are not so insubstantial that the case 
warrants the issuance of a written opinion in the case.1l4 
Andersen LLP performed an independent audit to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the new streamlining as it was implemented 
between September 2000 and August 2001. 115 In FY 2001, for the 
first time in a number of years, the BIA completed about 4,000 more 
cases than it received. The auditor reported a fifty-three percent 
increase in the overall number of cases completed during the 
implementation period.116 The auditor also reported that the 
available data did not indicate an adverse effect on non-citizens. The 
Andersen report concluded that the new streamlining rules resulted 
in an unqualified success.u7 
113. Final Rule, supra note 111, at 54,879. 
114. Executive Office for Immigration Review, General Provisions, 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1 (2004). 
115. Anderson LLP, Board of Immigration Appeals Streamlining Pilot 
Project Assessment Report (2001) (independent study conducted for the Executive 
Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep't of Justice), reprinted in Dorsey & 
Whitney, LLP, Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve 
Case Management app. 21, at 138 (2003) (study conducted for the American Bar 
Association Commission on Immigration Policy, Practice and Pro Bono) 
[hereinafter Dorsey & Whitney Study], http://www.dorsey.comlfiles/upload/ 
DorseyStudyABA_8mgPDF.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2005). 
116. [d. at 5-8. 
117. [d. 
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The independent auditor reported this in December 200l. 
Despite the positive findings and conclusions, just two months later 
Attorney General John Ashcroft authorized new policies in the name 
of streamlining that fundamentally changed the nature of the BIA's 
review function. In addition, he radically changed the composition of 
the Board. 
The February 2002 proposed rule, which became final in 
August 2002,118 resulted in three major changes. First, single 
member became "the dominant method of adjudication for the large 
majority of cases",119 and single member summary affirmances 
became commonplace.l20 Second, the Ashcroft streamlining 
effectively eliminated the BIA's de novo review of factual issues that 
had existed for almost half a century.121 The new rule accomplished 
this by establishing "the primacy of the immigration judges as 
factfinders" and requiring the Board to defer to the Immigration 
Judge unless a decision is "clearly erroneous."122 To understand the 
far reaching nature of this change, it is necessary to understand why 
the Board exercised this power throughout the second half of the 
twentieth century. Former BIA Chairman Paul Schmidt articulated 
the rationale for the Board's de novo powers in his dissent in Matter 
orA.S.: 
In many cases, the expertise, independence, and 
sound judgment of this Board is all that stands between an 
asylum applicant and return to a place where he or she will 
face persecution or death. It is quite possible that we review 
more asylum adjudications than any other tribunal in the 
world. Certainly, each Board Member adjudicates many 
more asylum cases, from a wider variety of nationalities, 
than any individual Immigration Judge. We also have a 
nationwide jurisdiction and a perspective that is not 
present in the Immigration Courts. 
118. Final Rule, supra note 113. 
119. Id. at 54,879. 
120. Letter from Larry Levine, Counsel for Legislative and Public Affairs, 
EOIR Office of Management Programs, to Stuart Drown, City Editor of The 
Sacramento Bee (Sept. 21, 2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/ 
LtrtoEditorSacBee.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2005). 
121. See, e.g., In Re B-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 1 (BIA 1955, A.G. 1956). 
122. Final Rule, supra note 113, at 54,881. 
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While we may lack the advantage of a face-to-face 
observation of the witness, we have the very substantial, 
and much underrated, advantage of being able to review a 
written transcript. We also have a talented professional 
staff to assist us in reviewing the record. In addition, the 
absence of personal interaction with the parties and their 
counsel in the trial courtroom insulates us from the almost 
inevitable, and often distracting, frustrations and 
extraneous factors that could accompany such personal 
interaction, particularly in a 'high-volume' trial system like 
the Immigration Court. Moreover, we have the opportunity 
for collegial discussion and the application of shared 
expertise to difficult appellate issues. 
Therefore, it is not clear to me why our vantage point is 
necessarily less revealing than that of the Immigration 
Judge and why we want to give such great deference to the 
Immigration Judge, rather than relying on our own 
expertise and sound, independent judgment after review of 
the written record on appeal.123 
As noted by David Martin, former INS General Counsel and 
professor of law at the University of Virginia, Immigration Judges 
adjudicate very large caseloads and "are under 'real pressure to 
conclude their cases and move forward' ... which is why they tend to 
dictate their opinions at the end of the proceedings, unlike federal 
judges who may take weeks to consider and write an opinion."124 In 
such a demanding system, serious mistakes are made regarding both 
factual and legal findings. 
Third, in addition to soundly rejecting this historical power of 
the BIA, the new rule reduced the membership of the Board from 
twenty-three to eleven authorized positions.125 According to the 
Federal Register, the Attorney General based this determination "on 
judgments made about the historic capacity of appellate courts and 
administrative appellate bodies to adjudicate the law, the ability of 
individuals to reach consensus on legal issues, and the requirements 
of the existing and projected caseload. "126 In the actual downsizing, 
123. In re A-S-, 21 1.& N. Dec. 1106, 1114 (BIA Feb. 19, 1998). 
124. Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar & Jonathan Peterson, 5 on Immigration 
Board Asked to Leave; Critics Call It a 'Purge', L.A. Times, Mar. 12, 2003, at A16. 
125. Final Rule, supra note 113, at 54,881. 
126. Id. at 54,893. 
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the Attorney General targeted the newer members who came from 
the practice of asylum and immigration law, advocacy, and academia. 
In endorsing the removal of these members, the Executive Director of 
the Center for Immigration Studies, which advocates significant 
restrictions on immigration, observed that "Board members should 
clearly represent the attorney general's views, since they are 
carrying out his responsibility. "127 Finally, during the downsizing 
transition, the Attorney General required BIA members to clear their 
current backlog of about 55,000 cases within 180 days.128 According 
to Human Rights First (formerly Lawyers' Committee for Human 
Rights), each Board member essentially had to decide thirty-two 
cases every work day, or one every fifteen minutes.129 
Not surprisingly, the Ashcroft changes were controversial. A 
July 2003 study conducted for the American Bar Association 
Commission on Immigration Policy, Practice and Pro Bono by the law 
firm of Dorsey & Whitney found that while the number of appeals 
granted or remanded remained steady between June 2000 and 
October 2002, the number of denials doubled.130 The grant rate 
declined from twenty-five percent before the spring of 2002 to ten . 
percent afterwards. Lori Scialabba, appointed Chair of the BIA by 
Attorney General Ashcroft,131 responded that the study relied on 
127. Alonso-Zaldivar & Peterson, supra note 124, at A16. 
128. Media Alert, Human Rights First, New Regulations Threaten to Turn 
Board of Immigration Appeals into Rubber Stamp (Aug. 28, 2002), at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/2002_alerts/0828.htm (last visited Jan. 
26,2005). 
129. Human Rights First, supra note 126. See also Lisa Getter & Jonathan 
Peterson, Speedier Rate of Deportation Rulings Assailed, L.A. Times, Jan. 5, 
2003, at Al (asserting that Ashcroft's overhaul of the system led to Board 
members having to decide cases in "minutes"). 
130. Dorsey & Whitney Study, supra note 115, app. 24 at 235. 
131. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Ashcroft 
Appoints Lori Scialabba as Chairman of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Aug. 
23,2002), at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002lAugustl02_eoir390.htm: 
Ms. Scialabba began her career with the DOJ in October 1985 
through the Attorney General's Honor Program and served as 
a trial attorney for the INS in Chicago, where she litigated 
deportation cases. From 1986 to 1989, she served as Assistant 
General Counsel for INS Headquarters in Washington, D.C. In 
1989, she joined the Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil 
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"outdated and unsubstantiated data from a Los Angeles Times article 
published in January 2003."132 
The impact of the new rules on the federal judiciary has been 
very serious. The Dorsey & Whitney study showed that the new rules 
have resulted in more than an 800% increase in appeals from BIA 
decisions to the federal circuit courtS.133 Overwhelmed with this 
surge, the federal circuit courts of appeal have developed their own 
backlog of BIA decisions. 
These changes are extreme, and no evidence suggests that 
dramatic changes to the procedures and membership of this very 
important administrative appeals agency were necessary. Before the 
Attorney General instituted these reforms, the BIA had already 
demonstrated its capacity to address the size of the annual caseloads. 
As noted in the Federal Register, the Board received over 27,000 
cases in FY 2001 and decided over 31,000.134 In fact, the Department 
of Justice reported in the Federal Register that it agreed "with the 
fundamental assessment that the Board's [initial] use of the 
streamlining process has been successful."135 If the Attorney General 
were truly concerned with addressing the backlog in a fair way, he 
could have required the Board to follow the very successful approach 
implemented by the 1995 asylum reforms: last in, first out. This 
allowed the Asylum Office to discourage abuse and ensure that 
refugees did not have to wait long periods of time for decisions. The 
Asylum Office quickly demonstrated its ability to handle the 
incoming caseload and then proceeded to decide backlogged cases in a 
fair manner. 
Division at DOJ as a trial attorney until 1991. She held the 
position of Associate General Counsel at the INS from 1991 to 
1994 when she was appointed Deputy General Counsel for the 
INS. She held that position until her appointment to the BIA. 
Attorney General Reno appointed Ms. Scialabba to the Board in 1998. [d. 
132. Letter from Lori Scialabba, Chairman, Board of Immigration Appeals, 
to Charles Carter, Editor-in-Chief, National Law Journal (Dec. 8, 2003), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/03IBIANLJresponse120803.pdf (last visited Jan. 
26,2005). 
133. Dorsey & Whitney Study, supra note 115, app. 26 at 237. 
134. Final Rule, supra note 113, at 54,878. 
135. [d. at 54,879. 
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Furthermore, no evidence has come to light suggesting that 
the Board's de novo review powers interfered with its ability to 
address a large caseload. Moreover, by ordering the BIA to issue very 
large numbers of decisions without any analysis and by removing de 
novo review, the Attorney General has stripped the Board of its 
capacity to ensure the accuracy of Immigration Judge decisions. The 
Attorney General also diminished the fairness of the review function 
by removing members for ideological reasons. 
Accuracy, consistency, and public acceptance are among the 
most important goals of any adjudicative system,136 The mere 
prospect of independent review encourages more thoughtful 
deliberation at the initial hearing stage, according to experts,137 In 
FY 2003, some 33,500 of 198,000 Immigration Judge decisions 
(seventeen percent) were appealed to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals by either non-citizens or the government,138 Subsequent to 
the limited review procedures established by the Attorney General, 
most decisions by Immigration Judges are summarily affirmed 
without explanation by a single member of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals. 139 Since such decisions do not provide any analysis, they 
cannot ensure consistent legal standards. Moreover, no one can know 
whether such decisions are accurate unless they are appealed to the 
United States Courts of Appeal. 
To ensure accurate and consistent legal standards and 
address the sweeping changes described above, Congress must 
intervene to establish an immigration review system independent of 
the chief law enforcement officer of the land. The Jordan Commission 
called for this change in 1997.140 It is ever more pressing today. 
136. See Stephen H. Legomsky, An Asylum Seeker's Bill of Rights in a Non-
Utopian World, 14 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 619, 622 (2000). 
137. [d. at 641. 
138. FY 2003 Statistical Year Book, supra note 87, at Y1. 
139. [d. 
140. U.S. Comm'n on Immigration Reform, Becoming an American: 
Immigration and Immigrant Policy, 175-183 (1997), available at 
http://www.utexas.edullbj/uscirlbecoming/full-report.pdf. 
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V. ENSURING THAT REFUGEES CAN SEEK AsYLUM AND FIND 
PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN THE REGION: THE 
TREATMENT OF HAITIAN AsYLUM SEEKERS 
Since the terrorist attacks, the U.S. government has treated 
Haitian asylum seekers with extremely harsh policies. First, in order 
to discourage Haitians from trying to reach U.S. shores by boat, U.S. 
immigration officials detained hundreds who had arrived on two 
separate boats about a year apart and expedited their asylum 
cases,141 When some 170 Haitian asylum seekers arrived by boat in 
Florida in December 2001, the INS instituted the new detention 
policy.142 In October 2002, more than 200 Haitians reached the U.S. 
coast by boat and swam ashore near Key Biscayne, Florida. Nineteen 
Haitians from this boat were picked up by the Coast Guard before 
they reached dry land and were reportedly returned to Haiti.143 In 
support of the new detention policy, the INS reportedly invoked a 
controversial regulation that had been established after the terrorist 
attacks and essentially gave INS Trial Attorneys the power to 
overturn an Immigration Judge's decision to release a detainee on 
bond. That regulation enabled the United States to detain Arab and 
Muslim non-citizens for prolonged periods without charging them 
with any terrorist or other criminal activity,144 
According to the Department of Justice, these policies were 
aimed at discouraging a mass exodus from a destabilizing Haiti in 
order to preserve U.S. Coast Guard and Naval resources to guard 
against terrorist attacks.145 The Department did not provide any 
evidence that such policies could deter a mass exodus in times of civil 
conflict or crisis. Lawyers for one Haitian detainee challenged the 
141. See Human Rights First, Haitian Refugees and the U.S. Asylum 
System, at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylumiasylum_04.htm (last visited 
Jan. 26, 2005); Women's Commission on Refugee Women and Children, Refugee 
Policy Adrift: The United States and Dominican Republic Deny Haitians 
Protection 20-32 (2003), available at http://www.womenscommission.org/ 
pdflht.pdf. 
142. Women's Commission on Refugee Women and Children, supra note 
141, at 29. 
143. Id. at 30. 
144. Id. at 32. 
145. Id. at 31-32. 
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policy and successfully convinced the Immigration Court and the BIA 
that U.S. law requires an individualized determination of release and 
that this particular Haitian asylum seeker merited release on bond 
to the custody of his family.146 The newly established Department of 
Homeland Security immediately asked the Attorney General to block 
the release of Haitian asylum seekers. This move evoked a storm of 
criticism from refugee advocates who argued that the U.S. 
government was dangerously exploiting the very real national 
security problems faced by the American people after the September 
11th attacks.147 Within a month of the DHS request, the Attorney 
General issued a precedent decision overturning the BIA, resulting in 
the detention of the Haitian asylum seekers until their asylum 
claims were final. I48 
Those Haitian asylum seekers who did not reach U.S. shores 
received extremely harsh treatment from the President himself. 
During the instability at the time of the ouster of President Aristide 
in March 2004, thousands of Haitians tried to escape the island. In 
response, President George W. Bush himself declared that the 
United States would return all refugees to Haiti: "I have made it 
abundantly clear to the Coast Guard that we will turn back any 
refugee that attempts to reach our shore. And that message needs to 
be very clear, as well, to the Haitian people."149 The Coast Guard 
interdicted and returned almost 2,000 Haitian asylum seekers 
between February and April 2004, after which the number of 
interdictions decreased.150 
146. See In re D-J-, 23 I & N Dec. 572, 573 (A.G. 2003). 
147. Media Alert, Human Rights First, Recent Victory for Haitian Refugees 
Thwarted by Department of Homeland Security; Major Refugee Rights 
Organizations Decry Decision (Mar. 21, 2003), at http://www.humanrightsfirst. 
org/media/2003_alerts/0321.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2005). 
148. In re D-J-, 23 1& N Dec. 572, 574 (A.G. 2003). 
149. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Photo 
Opportunity with Georgian President Saakashvili (Feb. 25, 2004), at 
http://www. whitehouse.gov/newslreleasesl2004l02l20040225-1.html (last visited 
Jan. 26, 2005). 
150. U.S. Coast Guard, Alien Migrant Interdiction, FY 2004 Flow 
Statistics, at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opVamio/flowstatslfy2004 migrant 
flow.xls (last visited on Jan. 26, 2004). 
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This is not the first time that the United States has directly 
returned Haitian asylum seekers. The first President Bush 
established the direct return policy in May 1992, and President 
Clinton kept it in place until 1994.151 These three Administrations 
have asserted that direct return does not violate the core 
international protection obligation agreed to by the United States as 
stated in Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention:152 "No 
Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion."153 The Reagan Administration read this straightforward 
language to mean that the United States must first determine 
whether a Haitian interdicted on the high seas is a refugee before 
taking any action to return him, and recorded that understanding in 
an agreement with Baby Doc Duvalier's regime.154 Nonetheless, the 
United States Supreme Court cleared the legal way for Presidents to 
mistreat Haitians by holding that direct return without any 
screening after interdiction on the high seas does not violate the U.S. 
obligation not to return refugees to countries of persecution.155 No 
President had previously referred to Haitian asylum seekers as 
"refugees" and then determined that such refugees will be returned 
directly to Haiti. While the second President Bush may be more 
honest about who is being returned, he flouts the core principle of 
protection found in this international treaty by doing so. 
151. Exec. Order No. 12,807,57 Fed. Reg. 23133 (May 24, 1992). President 
Clinton decided not to modifY that order after he assumed office. See Sale v. 
Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155, 164-65 (1993). For a full discussion of the 
non-refoulement obligation, see Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Aiding and Abetting 
Persecutors: The Seizure and Return of Haitian Refugees in Violation of the U.N. 
Refugee Convention and Protocol, 7 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 67 (1993). 
152. See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S at 164-65. 
153. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted July 28, 1951, 
art. 33, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6276, 189 D.N.T.S. 137, 176 (entered into force Apr. 22, 
1954). 
154. See Agreement to Stop Clandestine Migration of Residents of Haiti to 
the United States, Sept. 23, 1981, U.S.-Haiti, 33 U.S.T. 3559. 
155. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. at 164-65. 
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The United States government can and should find better 
ways to balance the responsibility to protect its own citizens and 
residents from terrorism and the responsibility to protect those 
fleeing persecution and serious harm. Certainly the United States 
must ensure that those who come to the United States do not 
threaten our security. But the President should never tell refugees 
that they should not try to flee persecution or harm. Nor should the 
United States pretend that detaining asylum seekers in the United 
States will prevent a mass exodus, since no evidence supporting such 
a claim exists. The United States can and must protect both refugees 
and its own citizens and residents. 
The answer to the immediate flow of Haitian asylum seekers 
is regional protection.l56 That means protection for some in the 
United States and for others elsewhere in the region. While the 
challenges to developing such shared responsibility are significant, 
the President's solution both harms people who deserve protection 
and diminishes the international leadership role that the United 
States needs to perform in encouraging other states to protect 
refugees. Given that most refugees seek asylum in developing 
states157, this leadership role is critical to an effective international 
protection system. 
The United States can also show leadership by protecting 
refugees fleeing conflict. Most of the asylum seekers who seek 
protection in the United States come from such countries. While the 
United States protects those with a well-founded fear of persecution, 
U.S. laws do not provide any humanitarian status on an individual 
basis to those who have a well founded fear of death. A limited group 
protection is provided at the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, but even that highly political determination does not 
protect people fleeing an ongoing civil conflict.l58 While the United 
156. For a full discussion of temporary protection, see Susan Martin, et aI., 
Temporary Protection: Towards A New Regional and Domestic Framework, 12 
Geo. Immigr. L.J. 543 (1998). 
157. See UNHCR, 2003 Global Refugee Trends 11 tbl. 1 (June 15, 2004), 
available at www.unhcr.chlstatistics. 
158. See Immigration and Nationality Act, Ch. 477, Sec. 244(b)(l), 66 Stat. 
163, 216 (1952) amended by Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, Sec. 
302(a), 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) and Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). 
Temporary Protection Status provides protection only to those already in the 
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States generally does not deport such refugees, the laws leave them 
without rights to stay in the United States and pursue livelihoods. 
Rather than leave such individuals without rights, the United States 
should establish an individual humanitarian status to protect those 
fleeing civil conflict.159 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The overall U.S. protection picture for asylum seekers since 
September 11th is disturbing. Fewer asylum seekers are reaching 
the United States. Approval rates in the first instance have seriously 
declined. The Attorney General has politicized and severely 
restricted the review function. The rights of many asylum seekers 
are disrespected, whether they make it to the United States or are 
intercepted on the high seas. 
Since September 11th, the United States has focused on 
fighting terrorism at a serious cost to our humanitarian programs. 
This article has analyzed the problems and achievements of the U.S. 
asylum system during this period and recommended ways to address 
those problems. The United States has a responsibility to protect its 
citizens and refugees in a more balanced way. By adopting these 
recommendations, the government will better be able to accomplish 
this goal. 
United States when it is authorized by the Secretary of Homeland Security. 
159. See Martin et al., supra note 156, at 566-80. 
